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This study is undertaken to evaluate the profile of the PKK (Kurdish Workers
Party) and Kurdish political behavior separately in an attempt to distinguish
the Kurdish issue from terrorism. PKK's profile has changed between 1978,
when it was founded and now, depending on Turkey's internal politics as
well as the changing international environment. Basically, it started out as a
Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, but by 1990 switched to demanding
a federation of Kurds and Turks, and simultaneously bidding for a role in an
independent Kurdestan comprising southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.
PKK's only consistent policy is to have remained a Marxist-Leninist organi-
zation so far. The first part of this article addresses the roots, objectives, and
methods of the PKK The second part assesses the problem within Turkey's
domestic environment, with a focus on whether PKK truly represents Turkey's
Kurds. The third section tries to answer the question of who provides the
logistical and financial support for PKK, thereby exploring the issue's inter-
national dimensions. The last section evaluates prospects regarding a "po-
litical solution" to the problems of the southeast, which is now being voiced
in both Turkey and Western capitals.
Current history is characterized by dichotomous forces of integration and disinte-
gration/anarchy. Turkey has not remained outside these trends. Turkish govern-
ments strive to integrate their economy into the world system by becoming a full
member of the European Union (EU). Although this may not happen in the fore-
seeable future, 1996 is targeted for a customs union with the EU. In April 1994,
the country experienced an economic crisis that the government is trying to man-
age through radical austerity measures. Fighting against the forces of anarchy—
that is, against PKK terrorism—^has contributed much to the current economic
instability. Though only a fraction of Turkey's Kurds are involved with terrorism,
three issues appear to have internationalized Kurds in recent years—^the first and
second Gulf crises and the terrorist activities of PKK (the Kurdish Workers'
This study was conducted under the auspices of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
(Bonn, Germany).
Address correspondence to Dr. Nur Bilge Criss, Faculty of Economics, Administra-
tive, and Social Sciences, Bilkent University, 06533 Bilkent, Ankara, Turkey.
17
18 N. B. Criss
Party), conducted mainly in the southeastern region of Turkey. Often, however,
this organization is perceived in the West as representing Kurdish nationalism.
Further, when both the domestic and foreign media label this violent activism as
"ethnic separatism" or "secessionism," they only add more confusion to a very
complex affair. Much lip service is paid to the point that terrorism and the Kurdish
issue are two different factors, but it is apparent that they are closely identified
with each other in the minds of many people, especially those who are committed
to the enhancement of human rights.
PKK's Roots, Objectives, and Methods
The Turkish Left began organizing legally as of the early 1960s by taking advan-
tage of the liberal 1961 constitution. The radical journal Yon symbolized a revo-
lutionary kind of socialism that even the Turkish Labor Party did not advocate.
Followers of this journal were elected as leaders of debate clubs that sprang up in
the major universities, and by 1965 these clubs formed a national confederation.
In 1970, the Federation of Debate Clubs was reorganized as the Revolutionary
Youth Federation (Dev-Gen?) under radical leadership. Out of Dev-Gen9 grew a
number of groups such as Turkish Revolutionary Culture Hearths of the East. The
only difference between these groups was that of strategy; otherwise they fol-
lowed the Marxist-Leninist or Maoist line. Another group, the Turkish People's
Liberation Army (TPLA), led by young men of Kurdish origin, wanted to begin
revolution in the countryside. According to their strategy, if southeastern Turkey
could become a liberated zone, supportive foreign countries would be invited to
join the struggle. TPLA divided Turkey into several zones, leaving the east to a
spontaneous Kurdish insurrection.' It was in this atmosphere of methodological
debates and leftist agitation that a Kurdish student at the Ankara University's
Political Science Faculty, Abdullah Ocalan, joined the Revolutionary Youth Or-
ganization. The leftist extremists did not consider the "liberation of Kurds" sepa-
rately from that of the entire country. Therefore, having decided that "liberating"
the Kurds was his first priority, Ocalan began to build an organization for this
task.
Thus the story of the PKK dates back to the early 1970s. It emerged
not in the guerrilla camps on the rugged terrain of southeast Turkey,
and not in the Middle East, but in Turkey's capital city one day in
1974. In other words, as far as its original roots are concerned, the
PKK came to being not in the Kurdish populated eastern parts of the
country. It has, however, always been dominated by Ocalan.^
Between 1974 and 1978 Ocalan spent his time studying theories of revolutionary
activity and organizing a party. In 1978, PKK was formally but clandestinely
established. Its mission was to make a communist revolution by guerrilla warfare,
and establish a separate Kurdish state. However, at that time PKK lacked arms as
well as militants. In order to finance its activities, it turned to robbing jewelers'
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stores and getting involved in drug trafficking. Since all of the leftist terrorist
organizations used the same methods, PKK went undetected by the authorities as
being a distinct group.
Meanwhile, since a series of coalition governments failed to curb terrorism
and to apply economic austerity measures, which were hampered by strikes and
lockouts, the military leadership decided to take over. On the eve of the Septem-
ber 12, 1980, military coup, PKX leaders left Turkey for the Syrian-controlled
Bekaa valley. They might either have foreseen that a coup was in the making or
have been in search of a safe haven abroad, for their activities were very limited
because of an existing martial law in the eastern and southeastern provinces. At
that time, the Syrians hosted all types of leftist terrorist organizations, whose
militants received guerrilla warfare training in many camps.
Between 1980 and 1984, Ocalan consolidated the party structure and estab-
lished himself as the undisputed leader of the organization, often by brutal meth-
ods against dissenters. According to those who managed to escape from his camp,
Ocalan had his closest followers tortured and executed, after accusing them of
being Turkish government agents, when he suspected any dissent. This caused
splits in the PKK, and some who managed to escape from Lebanon established
their own organizations in Europe and/or joined others such as TEVGER (Kurdistan
Liberation Movement), a united platform composed of Kurdish movements out-
side PKK?
Following the September coup, many militants of Kurdish origin who were
not related to PKK but were members of a leftist splinter group, TIKKO (Turkiye
Isfi, Koylu Komtinist Ordusu, Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Communist Army),
found common cause with PKK militants in prisons when they were sentenced to
various prison terms by the state security courts. Some joined PKK camps in
Syria and Lebanon once they had served their prison terms or had broken out of
jail, as many were successful in doing.
As of 1984, the military arm of PKK, ERNK (Kurdistan National Liberation
Front), was established, but it fell short of the desired impact because its hit-and-
run missions lacked regional support. As a result, Ocalan decided to set up the
ARGK (Kurdistan Popular Liberation Army), which was supposed to be the nucleus
of a people's army. After that, the PKK increased hit-and-run operations in Turk-
ish territory, with the odious result of now having killed nearly 10,000 people, the
majority of whom were Kurds. The PKK's objective in murdering its own kin
has been threefold. First, it demonstrates to the people that the PKK is a strong
force with whom they should side and rise up in rebellion against the Turkish
state. This objective may defy logic, but it is nonetheless a traditional behavior in
tribal power politics. Second, it sends people the message that as long as they
remain passive, PKK will consider them to be on the enemy's side and therefore
punish them. Third, PKK's wrath is mainly directed against village guards whom
the state arms and employs against PKK attacks. They not only murder individual
guards, but massacre entire families of guards, including women, children, and
babies. This method, however primitive, has long been common in blood feuds
among the people of that region, though not on this scale, and only adds to "bad
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blood" between the many Kurdish tribes who are pro-Turkey and the PKK. How-
ever, this has not stopped some of the village guards from collaborating with both
the state and PKK when they get involved in selling arms to the latter, or from
participating in the lucrative narcotic smuggling that feeds PKK's coffers. There-
fore the wisdom of arming and paying a monthly salary to some 40,000 village
guards who face losing this income when terrorism subsides is now being seri-
ously questioned. While this measure may have served the state in the short run,
there are indications, such as village guard demands for salary raises and social
security, that the guards would like to settle for permanent salaried positions
instead of reverting to toil. It would not be in this group's best interests, then, for
terrorism to be totally overcome.
By 1992, the number of PKK militants and supporters was reputed to be
about 10,000. How did this happen? Among the methods used by PKK militants
to recruit manpower were kidnapping young men and women or threatening to
kill boys approaching the age of military service unless they joined the organiza-
tion. Once boys were recruited in this manner, families naturally were inclined to
lend support, at least by way of food, clothing, and shelter. And should the young
man lose his life in a clash with security forces, an entire clan of such a family
could be converted. Outright greed on the part of some village guards to extract
as much benefit from their employment as well as from supporting PKK, some-
times for the purpose of self- or family insurance, created an impasse. In addi-
tion, heavy-handed approaches by the gendarmerie against the people whom they
suspected of collaboration with PKK provoked sympathy for the organization.
The high birthrate and ensuing problems with unemployment are another
reason that PKK's ranks swelled. For example, in 1993, while the annual birth-
rate in western Turkey was 1.9%, it was 4.1% in the east.* Moreover, the Turkish
state built regular lycees but no vocational or professional schools in the region.
This resulted in a number of reasonably educated but unemployed youth. This
pool also became a breeding ground for PKK recruits.
The last but perhaps most important reason that by 1992 PKK had become
the major problem for Turkey was the attitude of Turkish leadership. Between
1983 and 1989, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal's evaluation of the PKK was that
they were only a bunch of bandits. Underestimating PKK caused loss of valuable
time. Resources and proper equipment and training were not provided to fight
against guerrilla warfare.^ The 1983 ban on expressing oneself in Kurdish was
lifted, but it remained a hollow gesture in the face of increasing terrorism. This
suggests that granting cultural rights does not necessarily mean that terrorism will
automatically cease, though it may be an aspect of containment.
In sum, PKK began to change the balance in regard to its own support be-
tween 1987 and 1990. As terrorist attacks forced Ankara to take a tougher stance,
people of the region were forced to take a neutral position. They observed that
"normal civilians" were not PKK's targets but that those who had ties with the
state were. Hence neutrality (self-survival) amounted to tacit support.
In 1990, there were clear signs of change in PKK policies. Until then the
PKK had only employed what it termed "armed propaganda." Now the time was
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ripe to assume a political identity along with armed struggle. Ocalan had detected
Western, and especially European, distaste for the low-intensity warfare that was
going on in southeastern Turkey. He decided to redirect human rights violations
away from PKK toward the Turkish state. Thus began a propaganda and disinfor-
mation campaign in Europe through cultural associations of Kurdish guest work-
ers and political/cultural associations set up by Kurdish activists in exile.
At its second National Congress in May 1990, the PKK made certain resolu-
tions. Among these were
to establish friendship with religious movements as they are truly against
the institution (system/state) . . . . To exist within a legal socialist party
with our mass forces . . . . To pull the Turkish popular masses and the
left-wing forces into the struggle against the special warfare put into
practice in Kurdistan and to propagate for the brotherhood of the two
people in order to activate this.*
These policies were to be carried out simultaneously with acts of sabotage. PKK
began to turn its guns increasingly toward public servants and security forces.
PKK propaganda claimed that state authorities were responsible for unsolved
murders, that entire villages had been burned down, that Kurds were treated as
second-class citizens and that their cultural identity was not acknowledged, that
Kurds had been oppressed for centuries, and that they were not allowed to speak
their own language.
Every murder in the region that might have been caused by blood feuds, honor,
or plain personal vendetta was immediately attributed to the state. Struggle for
regional leadership within the PKK ranks sometimes ended up in murder, which
was again blamed on the state. And terrorist tactics were not above killing people
who were loved and respected in the region—^those who headed local Human
Rights Associations, or even selected socialist party candidates as witnessed in
1994. But these murders remained unsolved, and fed conspiracy theories.
In addition, the Hizbollah faction casts another shadow of doubt on unsolved
murders. A self-styled Hizbollah ("Islamic" terrorist organization) has been ac-
tive in the area and appears to be the armed protector of the pro-Islamic Welfare
Party. According to many observers, throughout 1993, in Diyarbakir, whenever
Ocalan ordered that all businesses close down their shutters, the only businesses
that did not do so were those protected by Hizbollah guards bearing Kalashnikovs.
Lately, some Hizbollah militants have been arrested and charged with responsi-
bility for a number of such unsolved murder cases.
As to entire villages being razed, there are 5,000 villages and 7,000 hamlets
in the region. In many cases, hamlets comprise three to five houses sheltering
30 to 40 family members. That is why, when PKK hit these hamlets, casualties
were so high. The impossibility of protecting each hamlet and even the larger
villages close to the borders, given the general adverse weather conditions and
rugged mountains, compelled the security forces to move people away from bor-
der areas. Also, many homes were razed so that they could not be used as shelter
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by PKK militants. Compensation for property loss is lacking and is a point of
criticism. But it is also a fact that over the past years there has been a steady and
voluntary migration from this area to cities elsewhere in Turkey.
When confronted with the accusation that Kurds have been discriminated
against, the immediate reaction of Turks is to start naming armed forces command-
ers, parliamentarians, ministers, professors, and even presidents of Kurdish origin.
Lately, Western diplomats qualify this reaction with the statement, "Yes, but as
long as they act like a Turk— t̂hat is, conform." On the one hand, it is unimaginable
for any responsible professional in any country not to conform to the laws of that
country. On the other hand, Kurdish cultural identity is on the rise after having been
ignored throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. The state might as well
prepare to recognize ethnic cultural rights of this group, who obviously have not
been assimilated like the rest of the ethnic or immigrant communities. Cultural
identity appears to be the only nonthreatening aspect of ethnicity for a unitary state.
While a Kurdish identity based on nationality has not been acknowledged for
reasons that will be taken up in the next section, a cultural identity has always
been acknowledged tacitly, and, as of the early 1990s, officially. Moreover, accu-
sations of discrimination do not account for the continuous and numerous inter-
marriages that have been taking place for centuries.
Regarding the prohibition of language use, there was an unenforceable ban
on the books between 1983 and 1991, and throughout the history of the Turkish
Republic, printed material in other than Turkish and Western languages was not
allowed. But speech is another matter. Today, thousands of Kurdish people, the
majority of them being women of the region, do not know Turkish. Accessibility
to schools, lack of transportation to even neighboring communities, and the ultra-
conservatism of the families prohibited these women from attending school.
There is yet another dimension to the problem. Illiterate boys who serve in
the military are given elementary education. In the 1960s, those of Kurdish de-
scent frequently objected to learning to read and write in the "unbelievers" (i.e.,
Latin) alphabet. Not Turkish per se, but the alphabet itself was objectionable to
those Kurdish youth on religious grounds. The history of Kurdish rebellions in
Turkey in 1924, 1926, and 1936-1938 is colored with religious sentiment against
a secular state. Whether rising against the state was truly motivated by religious
fervor or whether this was used as a cover for Kurdish nationalism is still debat-
able. However, the strong religious sentiments of the Kurds forced PKK to change
its parlance by the 1990s and further may have allied many Kurds—some claim
under Ocalan's directives—^to vote for the pro-Islamic Welfare Party in the 1994
local elections. Both PKK and the Welfare Party would ultimately like to trans-
form the Turkish state. The former wants a federation of Kurds and Turks; the
latter wants a totalitarian state ruled by Shari'a laws. For PKK to endorse the
Welfare Party would be a marriage of convenience, not love. The Welfare Party's
"promised land" appears to be a Kurdish confederation encompassing Iran's,
Iraq's, Syria's, and Turkey's Kurdish populations. The common denominator would
be living under an Islamic regime.' But whose Islamic regime? The Welfare
Party is quite ambiguous about drawing a line between Pan-Islam and irredentism.
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Ocalan is shrewd enough to realize that one cannot ride the fundamentalist
tiger for long, especially after the experience of the Iranian Kurds. Along with all
other factions, the Kurds in Iran had supported the Islamic revolution, thinking
that Khomeini could be controlled. The 1980 Kurdish rebellion in Iran, because
their aspirations for autonomy were not met, resulted in the execution of 10,000
Iranian Kurds. Khomeini subsequently began to call on the unity of Islam that
transcends sectarian, ethnic, racial, and national loyalties in order to keep unity in
Iran, where other ethnic groups outnumber Persians.' Hence PKK may opt to
gamble with a religiously oriented party in the short run, but clearly cannot ex-
pect salvation from that quarter for long. Further, in the 1994 local elections, the
Welfare Party candidates were successful in winning 350 mayoral seats but were
not nearly as successful in winning seats in provincial, town or city assemblies
either in the region or nationwide. Therefore one is compelled to look for other
reasons behind the votes that went to the Welfare Party mayors in the south-
eastern areas that had traditionally voted for the Social Democrats, instead of a—
so far unestablished—^PKK order. Some people were perhaps attracted to the
Welfare Party promises that in the future, living in an Islamic community as
opposed to a nation-state, all Muslims would be equal. The terms of such equal-
ity, however, have not been identified to this date. The question of PKK's repre-
sentativeness of Turkey's Kurds will be evaluated in the second part of this study
in light of the known orders of Ocalan regarding the 1994 elections—namely,
that people should boycott the elections but, if they had to vote, should spoil the
votes.
Nevertheless, PBLK had to flirt with religion for a number of reasons. First, by
1990 it had became obvious that the Marxist-Leninist (hence atheist) PKK was
unable to draw the mass support it needed from a society in which religious
sentiment was very strong. Second, ties were forming between the Iranian
Islamic Republic and PKK (for reasons other than Iran's support for Kurdish
terrorism per se, which will be discussed in the third part of this article). Third,
Ocalan suddenly realized the importance of religion as another support mecha-
nism. As of 1989 PKK propaganda leaflets and brochures began and ended with
prayers. Islam was being lauded as a revolutionary force in itself.
Accordingly, between 1990 and 1993, PKK was the beneficiary of (1) the lack
of a coherent policy on the part of the Turkish state, whose leadership consistently
underestimated the issue; (2) the power vacuum in northern Iraq following the Gulf
War of 1990-1991; (3) the escalating risk environment around Turkey's borders;
and (4) overt and covert propaganda against Turkey, playing on the human rights
aspect. This is not to deny that there have been violations of human rights, but to
point out that cases of individual abuse were turned into gross generalizations of
violations of human rights by the PKK propaganda machine.
Propaganda coupled with Western sensitivities on human rights culminated
in a crisis between Germany and Turkey in 1992. Following TV camera shots
depicting an armored vehicle carrier that was pulling the dead body of a PKK
militant, tied to it by a rope, the German government enforced an arms embargo
against Turkey. The German government claimed that
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the armored vehicle carriers were given to Turkey on the condition
that they would not be used outside NATO purposes. . . . A message
from Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Cetin, reiterated the
fact that Germany and Turkey were both party to the NATO Strategic
Concept of 1991, the Washington Treaty and the London Declaration
to safeguard the freedom and security of all member states.'
While the new NATO Strategic Concept included combatting terrorism, popular
sentiment against Turkey ran high in Germany, and while the Turkish Foreign
Minister couched the incident in refined diplomatic language, Turkish security
forces on the spot in the southeast region had to survive. The dead body of the
PKK terrorist was tugged in that manner because the PKK militants were known
to set booby traps under the bodies of their dead such that when security forces
moved the bodies, they were blown up. But emotions fed by local PKK propa-
ganda in Germany were running high enough to compel the German government
to impose an arms embargo on Turkey. PKK was becoming a political force with
which to be reckoned. By its methods, whether violent or political, PKK forced
the Turkish state not only to adopt a policy vis-a-vis terrorism but also to further
its democratization process. The current debate is on methodology, not principle.
Turkey's Domestic Environment
Although Turks were the last of the Ottoman communities to come to grips with
nationalism, that very Ottoman heritage and perspective did not allow for racial/
ethnic discernment except on the basis of religion. Therefore the philosophy behind
recognizing only particular minorities in the Turkish Republic—namely, Jews,
Greeks, Armenians, and other minor Christian sects in the Treaty of Lausanne
(1923)—^was based on protecting religious rights. Otherwise, there was not and
has not been any need to protect Muslims' religious rights. Accordingly, the term
minority has a very special connotation for the Turks, which is exclusive of all
Muslim Turkish citizens. The British delegation at Lausanne were not able con-
vince the Turks to recognize Muslim minorities because it was simply not an issue.
During the euphoria of nation building, however, "Turkishness" may have
been overplayed to the extent that geographical names were changed to Turkish,
and giving children any names that were not "Turkish" meant a long battle with
the bureaucracy. Yet there is no objection to names such as Isa (Jesus), Ismail
(Ishmael), Ilyas (Elias), and Danyal (Daniel). But had Turkish society not been
conscious of this paradox, the majority of the people could not have accepted the
late President Ozal's official recognition of Kurdish identity. Language, identity,
and folklore are acceptable notions in Turkey, whereas the idea of an "ethnic
minority" falls on deaf ears as far as the Muslim population is concerned.
Studies on ethnic groups in Turkey found 47 such groups. Four Kurdish
groups were identified as Sunni, Alawi, and Yezidi, in addition to Alawi and
Sunni Zazas, whose Kurdishness, based on language, is refuted by a Kurdish
linguist. This is based on the fact that Zaza and Gurmanj (spoken by the majority
PKK Terrorism in Turkey 25
of Kurds in Turkey) are mutually unintelligible.'" However, "the question must
remain as to how the existence of these groups can be equitably recognized
within a national commonwealth."" The Ottoman Empire was a commonwealth
of proto-nations that disintegrated into 12 nation-states. The Republic of Turkey
is inevitably a mirror of the empire, accommodating 47 known group identities.
The republic, too, from an ethnic viewpoint is a commonwealth. On this basis
alone, the state would not opt for a federation on ethnic grounds and do justice to
all other ethnic identities. Demographic distribution is another factor that would
render such an eventuality unfeasible.
According to one writer, the recent success of the Welfare Party in the 1994
local elections "will inevitably catalyze a new social contract in this country
whose ethnic, religious, and sectarian divisions are becoming more apparent as
time goes on. The social contract will have to of necessity be based on demo-
cratic ideals in order for all to have their breathing space.'"^
It may have taken PKK terrorism and the Welfare Party to introduce to the
Turkish political milieu the idea that economic liberalism alone does not make a
country liberal. Intellectual liberalism, which would encompass recognition of
cultural plurality and free expression of identities, would almost ensure voluntary
assimilation to the dominant culture, as happened in the United States. (Yet the
official language in the United States remains English, and in no state is the primary
medium of public education other than English. Spanish remains an optional
second-language course even in those states with a majority of Spanish-speaking
people. A similar step might address the language issue for the Kurdish population.)
What else could the new social contract cover? There seems to be no alterna-
tive but to suggest that the best solution lies in furthering democratization and
political liberalism, which would culminate in providing autonomy to local and
regional administrations. Such autonomy would comprise freedom to raise funds
for municipal ventures and to impose local taxes for regional economic develop-
ment purposes. However, a viable supervision mechanism is necessary over local
administrations so that elected leaders do not turn out to be regional lords. The
issue at stake seems to be economic underdevelopment, not ethnic separatism.
The latter appears not to be the will of the majority of either Kurds or Turks.
Presenting the issue in these terms, however, should not draw attention away
from a "Kurdish issue" that desperately awaits a solution as a domestic problem.
But who represents the Kurds as a reliable party acceptable to both Kurds and
the state? PKK claims to represent the Kurds of Turkey. A PIAR-Gallup poll in
1992 found out that 29% of the region's population and 28% of the people
nationwide agreed.'^ In a book of interviews, none of the 23 Kurdish intellec-
tuals and leaders endorsed PKK's representation, however.''' Another fact that
speaks for itself about PKK's alleged representation is that in the 1991 general
elections the People's Labor Party (HEP—Halkin Emek Partisi), founded in 1990
by a group of Kurds, ran on the Social Democratic Party (SHP—Sosyal Demokrat
Halk9i Parti) ticket. HEP's decision was plausibly based on the fact that in the
previous 1989 local elections mayoral candidates who were known to be pro-
PKK had only attracted 7% of total votes. In addition, the Turkish Constitution
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forbids political parties to be established on the basis of class, religion, and ethnic
groups. That HEP was founded following the resolution of PKK's Second Na-
tional Congress "to exist within a legal socialist party with our mass forces" was
hardly a coincidence. However, the majority of the approximately 12 million
Turkish Kurds do not live in the region. About 5 million live in east and south-
east Turkey. And because those living outside the region voted, most Kurds must
have been represented by other political parties.
HEP was closed by a Constitutional Court decision on July 14, 1993, because
its radical members immediately began to exhibit pro-PKK behavior, wearing
PKK colors and adopting PKK slogans in the Turkish parliament. Although poli-
ticians whose party is closed by the Constitutional Court are barred from politics
for 5 years, deputies can circumvent such a prospect. Most resign from their party
before it is closed and are free to establish a new party once the former is dis-
solved. Therefore as soon as HEP was closed, the same deputies formed the
Democratic Party (DEP). But they continued to behave in a less than sophisti-
cated manner. For instance, two of them visited the U.S. State Department on
official Turkish passports to complain to junior American bureaucrats about the
Turkish government.
The state prosecutor's case accused HEP deputies, among other offenses, of
racism because of their public references to a Turkish nation and a Kurdish
nation, which had the potential of provoking unmitigated differences into a civil
war.'^ As a group identity, Kurdishness is undeniable. But ethnicity, when not
linked to race, is a matter of culture. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain
why Circassians, including emigres from the Caucasus following the 1877-1878
war between the Ottomans and the Russians, having settled in the east and south-
east region, call themselves Kurds today. A prime example is the deputy Chair-
man of DEP, Remzi Kartal. He is culturally a Kurd, but a descendant of a family
that migrated from the Caucasus, not "Kurdish" at the time. Therefore it is ironic
when a representative of cultural ethnicity demands a "binational" state for Tur-
key. This idea has at least one academic supporter known to the author. In Tur-
key: A Modern History, Erik J. Zurcher states.
Courageous steps are needed in the direction not of a Kurdish national
state, which would have the greatest repercussions for the millions of
Kurds living in Turkey's big cities, but for real bi-nationalism. Turkey
will have to become a bi-national state, with Kurdish as its second
language in the media, in education and in administration.'*
Turkey cannot afford the luxury of experimenting with a binational state,
even under the most liberal circumstances, simply because of its geostrategic and
geopolitical status and, perhaps more important, because this is not the preference
of the nation. While introducing such concepts may feed academic revisionism, it
definitely does not correspond to Turkey's realities psychologically, politically,
or strategically.
In March 1994, the immunities of five extremist DEP deputies were lifted so
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that the courts might look into criminal acts, including collaboration with PKK.
One may be driven to think that the sole motive of these deputies was to force the
state to take radical steps. These steps, in turn, would promote international pres-
sure on Turkey. Otherwise, one cannot account for DEP Chairman Hatip Dicle's
public comment concerning the February 1994 bombing murder of five unarmed
cadets at a train station in an Istanbul suburb, that in a state of war such incidents
were normal. This statement came at a time when the authorities were looking
into alleged organic ties between DEP and PKK.
One DEP deputy is being investigated on charges of laundering illegal PKK
money, others on charges of propagating change of the regime. Yet there are
sufficient moderate members of the party that faces closure who are working to
re-form as another political party. The new party is to have a broader base by
including Turks, and reportedly will adhere to leftist philosophy.
An incident that raised questions about PKK's real strength was the 1994
local elections. DEP had withdrawn from the elections because several of their
candidates had been assassinated, having fallen victim to unsolved murders. At
the same time, PKK had threatened ail other political parties and the electorate
with reprisals if they ran for office or cast votes. If the people did go to the ballot
boxes, they were supposed to cast blank votes.
According to unofficial results, the turnout by voters in Diyarbakir,
where the PKK is believed to be strong, was 79.86%, with the percent-
age of spoiled votes standing only at 7.8%. In Hakkari, 89.40% of the
voters turned out, with spoiled votes at only 7.8%. In §irnak the turn-
out was 74.54% and spoiled votes only 8.3%."
These results signaled two facts. First, PKK's instructions were not heeded, and
people went to the ballot box. Second, by this behavior, the people of the region
showed the state that they should no longer be suspected of being potential or
actual PKK supporters. The final election results support this contention.'* In
1989, without any orders from PKK to spoil votes, invalid votes were 5%, the
rate of voter participation in eastern and southeastern Turkey being near 80%. In
1994, following orders from PKK to boycott the elections or cast invalid votes,
fmal election results were as follows: 3.8 million people (Kurds and non-Kurds)
voted, indicating 88% participation. Invalid votes were 15% of those cast. If 5%
is taken as a margin of error based on 1989 figures, then the actual votes spoiled
were 10%. This implied that fewer than 300,000 people of the more than 2
million Kurds who voted obeyed PKK's orders. Figures do not show the PKK
and its regional support to be representative of Kurds or non-Kurds living in east
and southeast Turkey. However, in April the pro-PKK monthly journal Sterka
Rizgari announced the number of voters in 20 "Kurdish" provinces to be 4,533,471,
valid votes cast as 3,508,510, and invalid votes cast as 3,368,143. The total votes,
then, far exceeded the number of registered voters cited by the same source by
some 2,343,182 unaccounted persons.
Further, the pro-Islamic Welfare Party votes for local administrators have
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increased from 10% to 19% nationwide on a single-tier election system including
the Kurdish votes attracted. Consequently Welfare Party mayoral candidates won
by 18% to 21% of the votes. This victory made a sham of the PKK's representa-
tiveness and showed that the media had greatly exaggerated it. This pattern clearly
leaves the initiative to the Turkish state to induce major acceptable reforms in the
east and southeastern region of Turkey, and to no one else, for there do not seem
to be any other viable representatives yet.
Another dimension of the Kurdish issue is the economy. There is a prolifera-
tion of literature on Kurdish history, language, and literature, and on the plight of
Kurds in southeastern Turkey, which is due to underdevelopment, tribalism, and
near-feudalism. Until recently, among the many ambiguous demands of Ocalan,
one thing was clear. Even he, who does not represent Turkish Kurds, announced
more than once that the PKK does not demand separation and that Kurds will
need Turkey for a long time to come, economically speaking, but that he would
welcome a federation of Kurds and Turks.
Though a federative reorganization seems out of the question for Turkey,
which has committed itself to a unitary state for historical, political, and social
reasons, the heart of the matter, even for Kurdish extremists, lies in the economy.
However, several months later, once the PKK coffers were full of money ob-
tained through extortion and drug trafficking, the organization was ready to fight
for an independent Kurdestan comprising southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq.
The changing risk environment of Turkey and the power vacuum in Iraq had
much to do with PKK's simultaneous objectives.
PKK caused a temporary halt to investments in the southeast when Turkish
intelligence publicized that terrorists were extorting money from bidders of gov-
ernment contracts and from public workers. The world's third largest dam and
irrigation system, called the Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (Guneydogu
Anadolu Projesi, GAP) was put into motion by the State Planning Agency in
1965. Consequently development projects in the area were not adopted for fear of
ethnic separatism or to appease the Kurdish population, but were inherent in the
overall development plans for the country. By 1996, water from the Ataturk Dam
(of GAP) will be used to irrigate 150,000 hectares of land. Subsequently, 22
dams and 17 hydroelectric plants will be completed at a cost of U.S. $32 billion
to the Turkish economy." Currently under construction, the six-lane highways
between Adana, Gaziantep, §anliurfa, and Diyarbakir will provide job opportuni-
ties for the local population, about 50,000 of whom are still nomads.
Although Turkey is already agriculturally self-sufficient, the decision to in-
vest in the southeast to further increase agricultural production is based on the
determination to bridge the gap between the development levels of western and
eastern Turkey. Economists agree that this policy alone contributes to the high
inflation rate in all of Turkey. The state, however, is committed to complete the
project, whatever the short-term costs will be. But without a rational land reform
program to accompany the development project, a major aspect of the Kurdish
issue—that is, the problem of unpropertied peasants, will not be addressed.
Turkey's development plans and activities have also created problems for its
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foreign policy, in that the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers became a
source of contention for Syria and Iraq. Whereas Turkey attempted to resolve this
issue by negotiation and agreement with Syria, the latter chose to support PKK
militancy against Turkey from its territory. It is noteworthy that the escalation of
PKK attacks corresponded to a time when the Birecik Dam on the Euphrates was
about to be completed.
Terrorism has succeeded in adversely affecting both public and private enter-
prise investments in the region. One hundred and sixteen industrial plants that
belong to the private sector await completion. But the sector is reluctant to pro-
ceed with the projects. The reason was put forth by Omer Din9kok, Chairman of
the Industrial Council, Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Stock Market: "One
has to become partners with PKK in order to invest in the Southeast."^"
Din9k6k's statement was based on the fact that PKK routinely extorts money
from people who start new businesses and benefits from bids on government
contracts. Moreover, in order to finance the purchase of more sophisticated weap-
onry such as Stinger rockets (a number of which were discovered in mountain
depots raided by the security forces in the spring of 1994), the PKK has begun to
"tax" rich businessmen of Kurdish origin nationwide. Other professionals, doc-
tors, contractors, builders, farmers, and teachers reportedly are not immune to
extortion either.^'
Although the largest portion of PKK's income is derived from drug smug-
gling, its annual budget is estimated to be TL 863 billion (U.S. $86 million). This
includes income from extortion in both Turkey and abroad, especially from Kurdish
and Turkish workers, most of whom reside in Germany.
The British National Service of Criminal Intelligence (NSIC) reported that in
1993 PKK extorted 2.5 million pounds sterling from immigrants and businesses.
According to the same source, PKK obtained 56 million DM from drug smug-
gling in Europe in 1993.̂ ^ In addition, only those businessmen of whom PKK
approves entered bids for government contracts in the southeast, in return for a
"commission" to the organization. Likewise, temporary workers in the southeast
who were paid a monthly net salary of TL 12 million (U.S. $1,000) were forced
to give up TL 8 million (U.S. $700) of this sum to the PKK.^'
In this manner, the Turkish government ironically ended up subsidizing the
terrorist organization. Therefore all investments to the area have now been stopped.
The government has a two-pronged approach to the problem. One is to use mili-
tary means to destroy PKK, and the other is to encourage the people to resist
PKK. In the long run, it is the people who bear the consequences of lack of
public services rendered. Lately, even the pro-PKK daily OzgUr Giindem com-
plained that there was only one pediatrician available for 20,000 children in the
Batman region, but it failed to mention that the PKK was specifically murdering
all types of public servants, including doctors, nurses, and school teachers.̂ "*
In July 1993, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu (filler, promised an emer-
gency financial aid package to the southeast. In view of subsequent develop-
ments, it appears impossible to carry out this promise, at least until terrorist
activity subsides.
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Banking is yet another sector that is diminishing in the region. Since 1991,
60 bank branches have been closed, the majority of which were private banks.
Banks that remain in the region closely scrutinize loans, and insurance companies
charge exorbitant prices for transport and property coverages. Discrimination,
which used to be nonexistent, is being forced by the PKK. Although only 4.2% of
bank deposits come from the local population, people can make use of only 2.7%
of the total credit available for agriculture and animal husbandry, since terrorists
have been murdering entire families and destroying their animals and fields."
And this violence is directed against their own kin simply because members of
these families are village guards whom the PKK regards as collaborators of the
state. The result is that the PKK condemns to abject poverty and misery the very
people on whose behalf it claims to be fighting, and also turns its weapons against
them.
By the end of October 1993, 700 schools in Diyarbakir were closed down,
either because PKK murdered the teachers or because school buildings were
burned down. Overall, 3,600 schools have been closed in the region. These schools
accommodated nearly 100,000 children.^*
The public sector, furthermore, had to absorb loss of income from electric,
telephone, or water bills in many areas because PKK intimidated the people into
not paying these bills. In certain provinces PKK banned purchase of alcoholic
beverages and cigarettes, not on moral grounds, but because these products are
under state monopoly. One objective seemed to be to deprive the state of income.
But also the purpose was to create a psychological atmosphere in which the
people would come to accept PKK as the sole representative (by force or volun-
tarily) of Kurdish interests.
How did PKK become a major challenge to the state by applying its own
version of martial law tactics within the boundaries of Turkey? How did it be-
come strong enough to enforce a ban on the publication of newspapers, threaten
local political party officials so that they had to close down their offices, and ask
all civil servants to leave the region?
In part, the PKK felt financially strong enough to act alone to achieve its
ultimate goal, namely, to be recognized as the only party representative of the
Kurds. But another reason may be found in the new regional power imbalance.
This brings us to the issue's international dimensions, for it involves direct or
indirect foreign support of PKK terrorism.
International Dimensions of Terrorism
Kurdish separatism in the Middle East was internationalized at the time of the
first and second Gulf crises. Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, respectively, have been fac-
ing similar ramifications of Kurdish problems within their borders. Yet it is very
premature to speak of Pan-Kurdism as long as Turkish Kurds express themselves
in the Latin alphabet, Iranian Kurds in the Persian script, and Iraqi and Syrian
Kurds in the Arabic script. Culturally, most Kurds have been largely assimilated
into the dominant national culture of the countries where they live. Moreover, the
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structure of their respective localized societies is based on clan or tribal identity,
which is very often characterized by hostility between clans or tribes. Therefore it
is difficult even to structurally define the nature of Kurdish nationalism.
Although the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and the Kurdish Sunni Mus-
lim Organization believe in armed struggle against the Iranian state, the Pasdaran
(Revolutionary Guards) suppressed these Kurdish guerrillas. Iran's Kurdish policy
during the Iran-Iraq war however, brought much strain on Turkish-Iranian rela-
tions because Iran had collaborated with and equipped Iraqi Kurds in order to tie
down a major portion of the Iraqi army. But since PKK attacked Turkish villages
from northern Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, the Turkish Air Force raided PKK
camps in northern Iraq in 1986-1987, with the approval of the Iraqi government.
This did not please Iran because it was not in a position to discriminate between
PKK and Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas, or so it claimed.
The following year, when war approached Iraq's oil-rich Kirkuk area, Turkey
began to transport troops to its southern border. Iran promptly declared that if
Iran took Kirkuk, it would not encourage the creation of a Kurdish state in north-
em Iraq. The contingency measures taken, however, were an indication of Turkey's
sensitivity on the issue. Even an autonomous Kurdish region set up under Iran's
sphere of influence would be intolerable to Turkey.
The second Gulf crisis resulted in the creation of a semiautonomous Kurdestan
in northern Iraq. Turkish foreign policy with regard to this problem is paradoxi-
cal: Although Turkey accommodates forces of the Operation Provide Comfort on
its soil to deter Saddam Hussein from further retaliation against Iraqi Kurds, it
also believes in maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity. An independent Kurdish
state carved out of Iraq is not in Turkey's national interest because it would be a
threat to the regional balance of power. Such a land-locked Kurdish state would
be economically dependent upon Turkey, and Iran would not tolerate a Kurdish
state under Turkish influence. The same premise held true for Turkey, for it
would not tolerate a Kurdish state under Iran's influence either. Both countries'
behavior during the Iran-Iraq war points to this factor. Moreover, an Iranian-
supported Hizbollah faction already regularly clashes with the Iraqi Kurdish forces
of Talabani and Barzani (Patriotic Union of Kurdestan, PUK, and the Kurdish
Democratic Party, KDP, respectively), forces as well as with PKK located in
Iraq.
During the past 2 years, Turkey has been exposed to PKK attacks from
Iranian soil. Only recently, Iran has agreed to cooperate and collaborate with
Turkey to identify and eliminate PKK camps on its territory.^^ For 2 years Iran
may not have had any qualms about PKK's existence on its territory because it
did not fear that PKK would serve as a model for Iranian Kurds. Iran deals with
rebellion by outright execution. There are possibly two major reasons for its
change of behavior. One is that Iran may feel more secure because of the change
in Azerbaijani leadership from the ultranationalist and irredentist Ebulfez El9ibey,
whom Turkey used to support (though not for his irredentist policies), to a non-
irredentist Haidar Aliev. Second, Iran must have reconsidered the implications of
Kurdish separatism in terms of the regional balance of power.
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Another example of how the Kurdish issue is manipulated by the regional
states to suit their interests is the case of Armenia. A peculiar development in the
Caucasus resulted in accommodating PKK camps in Armenia. A tiny "Lacin
Kurdish Republic" was declared in Armenian-held Nagomo-Karabagh, and Kurdish
villages on the border between Armenia and Turkey came to serve as bases from
which PKK infiltrated Turkey.̂ ^ Although the current Armenian leadership may
be sincere in working toward good relations with Turkey, it may not be able to
control the extremists in its system at all times. This lack of control, coupled with
the fact that a substantial number of PKK terrorists who are killed by Turkish
security turn out to be Syrian citizens of Armenian origin, is not conducive to
confidence building.
It may well be remembered that when, for tactical reasons, the Armenian
terrorist organization ASALA, based in Lebanon, stopped assassinating Turkish
diplomats, PKK terrorism began. This is curious, at least as far as timing is
concerned. Considering that there is always a certain degree of solidarity between
international terrorist organizations, the Armenian involvement in PKK terrorism,
whether it comes from Armenia proper or from the diaspora Armenians, remains
a problem for Turkish foreign policy as well as for Turkish security.
As of November 1993, Yerevan formally declared that it was ready to col-
laborate with Turkey against the PKK. Since there is dire need for concrete
confidence-building measures between Turkey and Armenia, Yerevan's gesture is
a welcome development.
Syria is yet another neighbor that has opted to support PKK, among other
international revolutionary factions. There was nothing unusual about this as long
as Syria served Soviet interests in the region. However, after the demise of the
Soviet Union, Syrian leadership not only continued to accommodate PKK's leader
in Damascus but also stepped up its involvement with PKK.
The Southeastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) and subsequently the
waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers became an issue of power politics
inadvertently, at least on Turkey's part, between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey,
since 1987, has been trying to reassure its neighbors about the release of the
downstream water. Even apart from this issue, water resources in the Middle East
are becoming scarcer. By the early 1990s Hafez Assad therefore chose to force
Turkey into releasing more water (from 500 to 700 mVs) by increasing his sup-
port for PKK. If Turkey released 700 mVs, it would only be able to use 30% of
the Euphrates, although 88% of the water sources that feed the river are in Turk-
ish territory. In addition, among the recent declarations of PKK's Ocalan was his
objection to the building of the Birecik Dam on the Euphrates River. This is
again indicative of the general symptom in the Middle East of using the Kurds
for one's own ends.
Syria has incessantly assured Turkey that it is not supporting PKK. But in
light of Turkey's ongoing development projects as of 1987, Syria escalated its
involvement with PKK and at the same time refused to cooperate on the manage-
ment of water flow, despite a number of protocols signed for that purpose. In the
early 1990s, a Turkish delegation to Syria reportedly delivered an implied threat.
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If Syria continued to house PKK camps and its leader, if it would not sever its
connections to PKK's income from drug smuggling through Syria, then Turkey
would be compelled to redirect the water to channels (the construction of which
is to be completed) and carry it to the Ceyhan River, which flows into the Medi-
terranean. From there, it would be loaded onto tankers to be sold to friendly
countries in the Middle East. Ankara may not perceive itself as bound by the
1987 agreement on security and cooperation with Syria as long as the latter does
not honor that agreement. A tripartite agreement could not be worked out either,
because Syria and Iraq insisted on sharing the waters downstream from Turkey
on unilateral declarations of need.
International law is not adequate in providing guidance on the non-navigational
uses of international watercourses. Some trends are emerging, such as equitable
and reasonable utilization and participation, and a general obligation to cooperate
"on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and mutual benefit in
order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international
watercourse."^' But it is necessary for the states involved to cooperate and plan
for a rational management of transboundary watercourses. In the Middle Eastern
context, this becomes difficult because the water issue is utilized in power poli-
tics, and so far this behavior has been conducive to conflict even though interde-
pendence should actually serve as a means to contribute to peace and stability in
the region.^"
Europe is only beginning to realize the predicament of Kurds and Turks
alike. On November 4, 1993, PKK militants attacked Turkish Airline offices and
Turkish banks, embassies, cafes, and businesses with Molotov cocktails in En-
gland, Switzerland, Denmark, Austria, Norway, France, and Germany. These at-
tacks resulted in one death and 16 wounded Turks. Apart from carrying terrorism
abroad, material damage to the establishment is usually compensated for by the
host country, a practice that brings an additional burden on these countries. The
German government has begun to move against well-known PKK agencies for
the first time in the history of PKK activism in Germany. By 1994, PKK had
been declared illegal both in France and in Germany, but not in the other Euro-
pean countries.
It is too early to expect other European countries to follow suit for a multitude
of reasons. First, the number of Turkish guest workers and emigres is not as high
elsewhere in Europe as in Germany. Second, many of the emigres into Europe who
are of Turkish citizenry but not of Turkish ethnic background asked for political
asylum in the past for purely hidden economic reasons. Subsequently, it was critical
that they keep up the farce about exaggerated human rights abuses in Turkey. This
is one reason that Europeans have difficulty in distinguishing between true and
false when it comes to human rights in Turkey, barring real cases of abuse.
In sum, the problem is formidable, but the message for a resolution is clear:
The problem can only be solved within Turkey through the Turkish parliament.
The political will exists. The debate, however, is whether terrorist activities should
be stamped out or at least minimized before a reform package can be applied, or
whether the struggles against terrorism and for reform should be conducted si-
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multaneously. The current government has opted for the former. Given the ef-
fects of the aforementioned subversive acts on economic activity in the region,
the government was hardly left with a choice in defining its priority. However,
the southeastern question remains to be solved. The fashionable approach nowa-
days, both in the liberal circles in Turkey and abroad, is to suggest a "political
solution," however ill-defined by the former and deliberately not defined by the
latter parties. The latter posture is perceived in Turkey as stemming from West-
ern avoidance of being impolitic and/or from not really being able to define an
acceptable solution to the dilemma without trespassing on Turkish sovereignty.
The issue lies in choosing between the survival of the Turkish Republic as a
nation-state or not. Turkey opts for the former, but needs to manage the Kurdish
issue in order to prevent anarchy and to contain those parties in the West that use
the issue as an argument against Turkey's integration with the West.
A Political Solution?
A political resolution to the "Kurdish problem" concomitant with a military solu-
tion to terrorism was being voiced both in Turkey and abroad by the end of 1993.
The wording of the Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department, Stephan
Oxman, by March 1994 was indicative of his government's official outlook.
Question (Anatolian TV): After you left the press conference, one of
our colleagues asked what you might have meant by a "political solu-
tion" to the Kurdish problem. Undersecretary Sanberk suggested that
question should be directed to you.
Oxman: Let me just say that nothing that I have said about that is
new: it's the same position I expressed when I was here in December,
but let me just amplify that. Turkey, first of all I want to stress, is a
very valued ally of the United States and we want a strong Turkey.
We support the Turkish government in its fight against PKK terrorism.
We also believe that a lasting solution to the problems in the Southeast
cannot be achieved through purely military means. We believe that
non-military civil and social solutions must be pursued at the same
time consistent with Turkey's territorial integrity, consistent with Turkey's
constitution, consistent with Turkey's tradition as a pluralistic, multi-
party democracy. We do not advocate any particular civil or political
solution or any particular means to those solutions. Those are for Tur-
key to decide. But we do believe that the Turkish government must
continue to pursue non-military solutions in order to bring an end to
the confiict.3'
The only nonmilitary solutions to this confiict seem to be nationwide reforms,
one being in the form of efficient local administration,'^ a change in the electoral
system from a single-tier to a double-tier system, and the containment of terrorist
attacks in order to be free to build up the region's infrastructure. Land reform and
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planned rational resettlement may reduce the hold of tribal leaders over the popu-
lace in the region who are pressured to vote for candidates from a particular
feudal lineage. Such representatives, in turn, enhance their own interests as op-
posed to those whom they represent. Clearly, the so-called "Kurdish question"
(while the majority of the approximately 12 million Kurds live outside the region,
leaving about 5 million Kurds within the region) is related to regional problems
of underdevelopment, not only economically but also in terms of the region's
sociopolitical structure. The discrepancy in the current structure is not between
Turks and Kurds, but between Kurdish tribal leadership and Kurdish peasantry.
However, the Kurdish issue does not end within the bounds of a certain region.
Given the demographic distribution, it is a nationwide challenge. But it is a
positive challenge in that it directs the Turkish state to reform conceptually,
structurally, and economically.
To seek a political solution in a "twilight zone" such as this one, the Helsinki
Citizens' Assembly held a meeting on February 15, 1993, in Istanbul. It was in
this meeting that political solutions to the southeastern problem were first verbal-
ized by the foreign guests and various Turkish civil associations. No one among
the many liberals, politicians, socialists, and Kurdish intellectuals was coherent
enough to define a political solution, and the assembly could not reach a consen-
sus on this issue.
For Hatip Dicle, chairman of DEP, a political solution meant an official
dialogue with PKK. Liberally oriented business leaders suggested a dialogue
between state authorities and local Kurdish leaders, without identifying them.
The conservative chairman of the Turkish Association of Chambers of Com-
merce and Stock Markets, Yalim Erez, stated that the concept of political solu-
tion was foreign-inspired. He supported a military solution first, to be followed
by reconstruction and investment in the region." Although there was no consen-
sus about the myriad of suggestions, some patterns have emerged to enable a
realistic assessment of the situation. First, Turkey rejects the idea of federation
and regards such suggestions as trespassing on its sovereign rights. A federation
would also mean succumbing to PKK. Second, PKK or its self-styled representa-
tives will not be considered a party for dialogue. Third, the best that can be
expected from demands for education in Kurdish is perhaps the introduction of
Kurdish as a second language in school districts where Kurds are in the majority.
Otherwise regionalism and language teaching may become a barrier to social and
professional mobility, which will imply automatic discrimination. Last but not
least important are increasing demands to enhance democratic rights nationwide,
strengthen local and regional administrations, and lift the ban on naming places
and individuals in Kurdish.
Turkey's struggle against terrorism pales compared to the anarchy being wit-
nessed elsewhere in the world where "war itself becomes continuous with crime,
as armed bands of stateless marauders clash with the private security forces of the
elites."'* Such deterioration of the political and social fabric does not seem plau-
sible in the Turkish context. With a strong state-building tradition, Turkey enjoys
viable institutions such as the military, the civilian bureaucracy, major universi-
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ties, a conscientious intellectual stratum, and civil associations to keep the nation-
state intact. At present, the Turkish military appears to have inflicted serious
damage on PKK in northern Iraq and will be setting up watch points in strategic
locations to prevent infiltration and PKK's further recruitment efforts." These are
further security points north of the 36th parallel, which is already a security zone
but is not conducive to containing PKK because it was not set up for that pur-
pose. Iraqi Kurdish leaders probably will not object to such a temporary arrange-
ment. They would not prefer to share power with PKK, which has proved to be a
constant embarrassment to them as Turkey has poured humanitarian aid into the
Iraqi Kurds.
Consequently there is not a monolithic Kurdism in the Middle East any more
than communism was or Islam is monolithic. The larger picture calls for an
appreciation by all policy makers that regional power balances only reinforce a
greater balance of powers.
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